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GIVE ME DISPROPORTIONATE ECONOMIC
HARDSHIP OR GIVE ME DEATH: THE
APPLICATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW
TO THE RENEWABLE FUEL STANDARD –
SINCLAIR WYOMING REFINING CO. V. EPA
ANDREW RASBOLD*
I. Introduction
In October 2017, the Tenth Circuit vacated an Environmental Protection
Agency (“EPA”) ruling in Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA.1 The
ruling creates serious ramifications for the Renewable Fuel Standard
(“RFS”) program, in which both renewable fuel and traditional oil and gas
industries have significant interests. The Tenth Circuit held that the EPA’s
denial of an exemption from the program exceeded its statutory authority.2
Although the court rationalized its holding according to Supreme Court
precedent, a dissent coupled with contrary holdings in other circuits
threatens to create inconsistent judicial results.3 Furthermore, substantial
political pressures brought by both supporters and detractors of the RFS

* Andrew Rasbold, J.D. Candidate, University of Oklahoma College of Law, Class of
2020. I would like to thank the editorial board of ONE J and Professor Monika Ehrman for
their help with this project, as well as my wife, Andrea, for her support and patience
throughout this process.
1. 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017).
2. Id.
3. Id.
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program seem likely to guarantee continued litigation along similar lines. 4
The decision implicates serious policy concerns, and potential changes, for
both the RFS program and broader application of judicial deference to
administrative decisions.
The federal legislature passed the Clean Air Act (“CAA”) in 1990 in
response to environmental concerns regarding the effect of pollution on
public health.5 The EPA is tasked with implementation of the CAA in
various respects, including the establishment and enforcement of
parameters by which fuel emissions, as air pollutants, are regulated.6 The
EPA implements the CAA’s mandate in part through the RFS program,
which describes the required blending by obligated parties of renewable
fuels with traditional fossil fuels prior to entering the downstream
marketplace.7 The Energy Policy Act of 2005 introduced the RFS system to
the CAA, and the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007 expanded
the program , bringing the program into its current implementation.8 The
blending of fuels is intended to lower the demand for traditional gasoline or
diesel fuels, thereby encouraging a greater reliance on domestic sources of
fuel—both traditional and biofuel—as well as reduce the pollutants
introduced to the atmosphere via the burning of traditional fuels.9
The RFS program attempts to provide a comprehensive industry
standard, but the EPA (as required by statute) does consider small refinery
exemptions for qualifying refiners.10 The administrative process by which
the EPA granted or declined exemptions was recently analyzed in Sinclair
4. See Renewable Fuels v. EPA, 18-9533 (10th Cir. Dec. 14, 2018) (WL, 10th Cir.
Docket); see also Ben Nuelle, Industry stakeholders react to draft fuel bill, AGRIPULSE (Dec.
11, 2018 2:32 PM), https://www.agri-pulse.com/articles/11737-industry-stakeholders-reactto-fuel-draft-bill (discussing criticism and praise of proposed changes to the RFS program).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq. (2017); Overview for Renewable Fuel Standard Program,
U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, https://www.epa.gov/renewable-fuel-standardprogram/
overview-renewable-fuel-standard. The CAA represents a broad congressional attempt to
describe the federal response to a multiplicity of pollutants affecting national health and
safety. While this paper will focus on the regulations regarding the production of gas, and
specifically the guidelines applicable to small refineries in the RFS program, the CAA
considers many variables beyond midstream blending.
6. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o) (2017). The renewable fuel program is described in
this statute, which defines the biofuels considered acceptable in blending and various other
criteria that the EPA further defines and implements.
7. Codified in 40 C.F.R. § 80.1100 (2018) et seq.
8. U.S. ENVT’L PROT. AGENCY, supra note 5.
9. See, e.g., Nadia B. Ahmad, Responsive Regulation and Resiliency: The Renewable
Fuel Standard and Advanced Biofuels, 36 VA. ENVTL. L.J. 40, 41–42 (2018).
10. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441 (2018) (“Small Refinery Exemptions”).
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Wyoming Co. v. EPA, and the resulting holding is likely to create
considerable ramifications throughout the industry, because Sinclair
invalidated the EPA’s previous determinative policy of granting or denying
exemptions.11 This note will explore the Tenth Circuit’s limitation of the
EPA’s administrative decisions as it relates to the small refinery exception
within the Renewable Fuel Standard expressed in 40 C.F.R. § 80.1100 et
seq.
II. Law Before the Case
A. An Overview of the Renewable Fuel Standard Program
The RFS is largely driven by requiring compliance in the Renewable
Identification Numbers (“RINS”) marketplace.12 The RINS program creates
a tradeable asset—the RINS—that is generated with and separated from a
required volume of renewable fuel.13 The RINS program is not without
controversy, and of primary importance to the context here is the burden of
the refiner, not a blender, to ensure the blending of traditional fuels with the
necessary biofuels.14 Pursuant to the EPA’s promulgated regulations, an
obligated party is “any refiner that produces gasoline or diesel fuel within
the 48 contiguous states or Hawaii. . . . A party that simply blends
renewable fuel into gasoline or diesel fuel, as defined in § 80.1407(c) or (e),
is not an obligated party.”15 Although the obligation seems counterintuitive
to the reality of blenders bearing the actual responsibility of creating the
blended product, the instruction makes more sense when recognizing the
program is also intended to encourage reliance on domestic sources of fuel,
thereby implementing broad legislative policy as well as describing
industry specifications.16 RINS are generated when traditional fuel is
11. Sinclair Wyoming Co. v. EPA, 887 F.3d 986 (10th Cir. 2017).
12. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1427. Obligated parties under the RFS system either generate or
purchase RINS to satisfy an algorithm that fulfills the calculated obligations of a refiner.
13. Id. § 80.1452. Description of the RINS asset.
14. See, e.g., Bob Neufeld & Rebecca Lynne Fey, Winners and Losers: The EPA’s
Unfair Implementation of Renewable Fuel Standards, 60 S.D. L. REV. 258, 259 (2015).
Refiners are often placed in the problematic position of ensuring compliance with the RINS
system with no viable means of actually blending the fuels. Therefore, refiners must sell
traditional petroleum without complying with the RINS mandate and trust that the blender
will comply with the RINS requirements. The obligation is important to the context as
refiners are incentivized to challenge EPA determinations.
15. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1406(a)(1) (emphasis added).
16. See Adam Christensen & Connie Lausten, Fundamental Inconsistencies Between
Federal Biofuels Policy and Their Implications, 44 ENVTL. L. REP. NEWS & ANALYSIS
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blended with a renewable biomass fuel—such as ethanol— in the manner
described by EPA regulations.17 RINS then demonstrate compliance with
the RFS program through a Renewable Volume Obligation (“RVO”)
formula that uses either generated or purchased RINS to compute a result
that indicates compliance.18
An exemption to the requirement that refiners satisfy the RVO through
RINS generations or purchase may apply in the case of administrativelydefined “small refiners.19 The economic incentive to seek an exemption is
substantial, with millions of dollars potentially saved should an exemption
grant a refiner relief from compliance with the RFS program.20 Refiners
meeting the definition of “small” must petition the EPA for the granting of
an exemption “period of not less than two additional years,” and the EPA’s
decision in turn considers a Department of Energy (“DOE”) evaluation that
compliance would create a “disproportionate economic hardship.”21 The
statutory basis for the administrative rule essentially mirrors the rule, in that
it provides the necessity of an exemption for “disproportionate economic
hardship,” as well as the petitioning requirements and the cooperation of the
DOE in studying the appropriate economic factors.22 The language of
“disproportionate economic hardship” is determinative to the evaluation of
Sinclair, as the implementation of the analysis prior to granting an
exemption by the EPA required a viability test to determine if compliance
with the program threatened a refinery’s survival, and a refinery seeking an
exemption challenged that process and procedure.23
10395, 10398 (2014) (“The rules around exported renewable fuels ensure that the RFS can
only be complied with by using renewable fuel domestically.”).
17. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1426.
18. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1427 (“How are RINS used to demonstrate compliance?”); 40 C.F.R.
§ 1407 (2018) (“How are the Renewable Volume Obligations calculated?”).
19. Id. § 80.1401 (“Small refinery means a refinery for which the average aggregate
daily crude oil throughput (as determined by dividing the aggregate throughput for the
calendar year by the number of days in the calendar year) does not exceed 75,000 barrels.”);
Id. § 80.1441 (“Small refinery exemption.”).
20. Jarrett Renshaw & Chris Prentice, Exclusive: EPA gives giant refiner a ‘hardship’
waiver from regulation, REUTERS, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-biofuels-eparefineries-exclusive/exclusive-epa-gives-giant-refiner-a-hardship-waiver-from-regulationidUSKCN1HA21P (Apr. 3, 2018 11:03 AM). Reuters reports that Andeavor and
HollyFrontier, two large refiners, were granted small refinery exemptions for individual
refineries within their organizations that saved each company approximately $58 million in
the cost of RINS credits for RFS compliance.
21. 40 C.F.R. § 80.1441(e)(1).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B) (2017); Id. § 80.1441(b), (e).
23. Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 988.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/onej/vol4/iss6/5

2019]

Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA

787

B. An Overview of Administrative Deference
1. Chevron and Skidmore
The challenge of an administrative action in the judicial realm
traditionally follows one of two doctrinal frameworks when judicial review
is necessary: Chevron or Skidmore.24 Each provides direction of how to
evaluate an agency decision.25 Chevron represents a highly deferential
judicial review of administrative decisions.26 Although the holding applies
to all administrative regulations that meet the threshold test, Chevron
ironically (with respect to the current subject) concerns another EPA ruling
regarding the CAA.27 The EPA promulgated regulations that enacted the
CAA’s mandate to control air pollution by allowing States to encapsulate
multiple pollutant-emitting devices within a single industrial grouping,
thereby controlling emissions from a larger source without necessitating
bureaucratic procedures as they relate to each single device.28 The EPA
based its decision on its construction of the term “stationary source,” a term
that received less than full statutory guidance.29 The first step of a Chevron
analysis is to question whether Congress has provided guidance to the
“precise question at issue.”30 If Congress has indeed provided specific
guidance, neither a court nor the agency may determine its own
construction of the issue.31 As a second step, if instead Congress is silent or
ambiguous, judicial inquiry is limited to whether the agency’s construction
is permissible and not whether a differing interpretation is possible or even
preferable.32 Such a standard is very deferential to the agency’s position, as
the Court recognized that silence or ambiguity is often intentional by

24. See, e.g., RONALD A. CASS ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS
(Wolters Kluwer 7th ed.) (2015).
25. Id.
26. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984)
(“When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized,
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable
choice within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal
judges—who have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made
by those who do.”).
27. Id. at 839–40.
28. Id. at 840.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 842.
31. Id. at 843.
32. Id.
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Congress, so as to provide a method by which the agency may determine
the best way to fulfill the legislative mandate.33
Skidmore represents a less deferential framework than Chevron, in that
the judicial analysis requires a balancing of multiple factors in determining
whether an agency decision is due judicial deference.34 Petitioners in that
case sought to overturn an agency decisions regarding the Fair Labor
Standards Act.35 The Supreme Court reversed the lower court’s
determination based on an understanding of employment law it found
incorrect, but it also provided the framework by which courts could
consider multiple factors in determining whether to grant an agency
decision deference.36 The rules and regulations of an agency decision could
guide the court depending on factors such as “[(1)] the thoroughness
evident in its consideration, [(2)] the validity of its reasoning, [(3)] its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and [(4)] all those
factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.”37 The
balancing approach allows courts to evaluate an informal agency action that
necessarily moves beyond a strict legislative grant of power without
presuming either lawfulness or illegality.38 More judicial deference is due
as the Skidmore factors become stronger.39

33. Id. at 843–44 (quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)) (“The power of
an administrative agency to administer a congressionally created . . . program necessarily
requires the formulation of policy and the making of rules to fill any gap left, implicitly or
explicitly, by Congress.”). Although the CAA amendments were “lengthy, detailed,
technical, complex, and comprehensive,” Congress was nonetheless deemed silent or
ambiguous as the specific issue before the Court, the “bubble concept” or “stationary
source,” was not directly addressed and therefore subject to deference. Id. at 848–51.
34. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944).
35. Id. at 135.
36. Id. at 140. The Court held that the lower court’s determination that petitioners were
not due damages because their claims for withholding of employment benefits were based
on times during which they were largely free to do what they wished and any burdens of
employment were not onerous was an incorrect interpretation of law. Id.
37. Id.
38. Supreme Court decisions have echoed the lessons of Skidmore and Mead. In
Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002), the Court upheld an informal agency
interpretation based on factors such as: (1) the interstitial nature of the issue, (2) the
expertise of the agency, (3) the importance of the administrative issue to the relevant
legislative statute, (4) the complexity of the administration, and (5) the length of time and
care provided to the issue.
39. Skidmore at 140.
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2. Mead and Barnhart
Although Chevron is still valid law and relevant to many administrative
decisions, further case law has developed new criteria for determining
whether to apply Chevron or Skidmore deference. In United States v. Mead
Corp., the Supreme Court has added a “Step Zero” to the traditional twostep analysis.40 In Mead, the Supreme Court held that Chevron deference is
applicable to formal regulations that have the force of law by an agency, not
informal policies.41 In Mead, the Customs Service changed its
categorization of an import, to which the importer objected.42 The
legislature directed the Customs Service to determine the classification of
imported items, but the method of doing so was explicitly limited to
individual transactions that other parties could not rely on and was therefore
outside the boundaries of Chevron deference because the categorical
descriptions did not have the force of law.43 Without a “lawmaking
pretense,” agency decisions cannot enter the Chevron doctrinal
framework.44 Agency decisions do not, however, rest entirely as acceptable
within Chevron’s framework or unacceptable if otherwise. Additionally, the
Court noted that deference could still apply to the Customs rulings, and
remanded the case with instructions to apply the Skidmore framework.45
Barnhart v. Walton represents another complication to determining
which application of deference is appropriate.46 In Barnhart, an applicant
appealed the denial of Social Security benefits.47 The Social Security
agency based its declination of benefits on an agency interpretation of
“inability” as it related to a twelve-month requirement of unemployment.48
Although the agency interpretation rested on less formal processes than
traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking, the Barnhart opinion noted
that no such requirement must be met before granting Chevron deference.49
40. Cass R. Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187 (April 2006).
41. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 221 (2001).
42. Id. at 224–26.
43. Id. at 222–27.
44. Id. at 233. The Court noted factors such as formal process, facial interpretations of
statute, and the effect of the regulation (whether broad or narrow). Here Customs had no
formal procedure for establishing a classification, a facial reading of the statute implied
interpretive rule only without the force of law, and the ruling only applied to a single party.
45. Id. at 238–39.
46. Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
47. Id. at 215–16.
48. Id. at 214–15.
49. Id. at 221–22.
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However, the Court noted that “the interstitial nature of the legal question,
the related expertise of the Agency, the importance of the question to
administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and the
careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period
of time,” when considered in conjunction of acting within statutory intent,
created context by which Chevron applies.50 Therefore, Chevron deference
may apply to informal agency decisions, but only after an analysis of
whether the agency is appropriately situated to make the determination.
III. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
Sinclair, at the time of the opinion, owned and operated two refineries in
the state of Wyoming that fit the EPA’s definition of “small refinery.”51 The
refineries were initially exempt from the RFS program until 2011 under the
initial terms of the statute.52 Under the direction of Congress and a
subsequent DOE study, the EPA extended Sinclair’s (and other refiners’)
exemptions until 2013.53 Following the expiration of Sinclair’s small
refinery exemptions, it petitioned the EPA for further exemptions under the
argument of “disproportionate economic hardship,” as required by
regulation.54 The EPA denied Sinclair’s petitions twice, on the grounds that
it found the refiner to be profitable enough to require RINS compliance
within the RFS program.55
In order to make such a determination, the EPA reviews a
recommendation by the DOE, a party privy to any petition by a refiner.56
The DOE bases its recommendation on a “scoring matrix” that reviews
potential impact on a refiner in either (1) disproportionate structural and
economic impact, or (2) viability.57 The DOE determines the impact prong
by looking at:
(1) “disproportionate structural impact metrics” (a refinery’s
percentage of diesel production, access to credit, local market
acceptance of renewable fuels, etc.) and (2) “disproportionate
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id.
Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 989–90.
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9) (2017)).
Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(A)(ii)(I) (2017)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id. at 993–94.
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economic impact metrics” (the firm’s relative refining margin,
the degree to which the refiner can blend renewable fuels,
whether RINs are a net source of revenue, etc).58
The DOE determines the viability prong by looking at:
(1) whether the cost of compliance ‘would reduce the
profitability of the firm enough to impair future efficiency
improvements;’ (2) whether ‘individual special events’ have had
‘a temporary negative impact on the ability of the refinery to
comply;’ and (3) whether compliance costs are ‘likely to lead to
shutdown’ of the refinery.59
The EPA explained its decision to deny exemptions to the Sinclair
refineries based on its long-term evaluation of the refineries, noting in
particular its (1) interpretation of “disproportionate economic hardship” as
something greater than simple impact, (2) the fact that the DOE’s
recommendation did not oblige the EPA to any decision, and (3) that a
refinery must face imminent closure due to the hardships created through
RFS compliance before the granting of an exemption.60
B. Issue
The Tenth Circuit looked to evaluate the appropriateness of the EPA
denial in the light of either Chevron or Skidmore deference.61 Although
each party argued that they should win in light of either doctrine,62 the
judicial determination of which analysis would be appropriate held clear
ramifications for the ultimate holding. The court was essentially
determining which party would win the litigation based on which doctrine it
applied.
C. Holding
After analyzing the EPA’s administrative process, the Tenth Circuit held
in favor of Sinclair.63 The court evaluated the agency’s determination based
58. Id. at 994 (citing J.A. Vol. 1 at 99–102 (DOE’s 2011 Small Refinery Exemption
Study)).
59. Id. (citing Aplt. Br. At 13–14 (quoting J.A. Vol. 1 at 103–04)).
60. Id. at 994–95 (quoting J.A. Vol. 1 at 17–20).
61. Id. at 991.
62. Id. at 992 (“Sinclair argues that we should review the EPA’s decisions using only
Skidmore deference, but maintains it would still prevail under a more deferential Chevron
review. The EPA, of course, argues the opposite.”) (citation omitted).
63. Id. at 999.
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on Skidmore, upon its conclusion that Mead compelled the court to forego a
Chevron analysis with its substantial deference.64 In applying Skidmore, the
court reviewed the relevant statutory language, the resulting agency
decision, and the plain language meaning of the associated words to
determine that the EPA’s decision was impermissibly narrow in light of its
own interpretation and so was not afforded any deference.65
IV. Decision of the Tenth Circuit
A. Majority
The majority opinion, while acknowledging general administrative
reviews as driven by Chevron, moved quickly into determining that Mead
required a review of whether the court should even consider the agency
action as having the force of law.66 Writing for the majority, Chief Judge
Tymkovich noted Mead’s evaluation of “notice-and-comment rulemaking”
was of particular importance to Sinclair’s appeal before the Tenth Circuit,
as the EPA’s determination of whether to grant exemptions was an informal
process and noted as “the same procedure employed by the U.S. Customs
Service in Mead.”67 The court placed informal adjudication squarely under
the Mead exception to Chevron deference, and therefore applied the
Skidmore analysis to the administrative action.68 The action was an
adjudication based on the legal ramifications specific to the individual
parties, and were informal based on the lack of traditional “trial-like”
procedures and protections (such as oral argument).69 Furthermore,
although some informal agency decisions are still afforded Chevron
deference in contexts such as Barnhart (requiring, primarily, specialized
knowledge and careful consideration over a long period of time), the
agency’s decision did not meet the standards for such substantial
deference.70
Other factors further influenced the court to determine that Skidmore was
the appropriate doctrine to apply. The court recognized the EPA lacked a
direct authorization to promulgate rules regarding the parameters of the
small refinery exemption, thereby limiting potential notice available to
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.

Id. at 992.
Id. at 993–99.
Id. at 990–91.
Id. at 992.
Id.
Id. (citation omitted).
Id. at 991 (citation omitted).
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Sinclair or other companies seeking to place refineries in the exemption
category.71 The informality of the process, already determinative to the
Skidmore rationale, was again referenced for the lack of expert testimony
that could be presented and therefore considered as having influence on a
decision with the force of law.72 Chevron also presumed an agency action
addressed from the top of the organization—thereby giving the action a
presumption of formality—whereas the EPA’s determination was made by
a mid-level official.73 Furthermore, the EPA’s decision had no precedential
value to third-parties (seen in Mead as influential to avoiding Chevron), and
the agency’s analysis was only a few years old.74 The above factors
therefore “compel[led the court’s] conclusion that Congress did not intend
the EPA’s interpretation of ‘disproportionate economic hardship’ to have
the ‘force of law,’” and the majority applied only Skidmore deference.75
The court then turned to an analysis of the EPA’s decision. The court
noted that the statutory authority for the agency action, as imperative to
both the action and any subsequent judicial review, provided two key
elements: (1) the statute failed to provide a definition of “disproportionate
economic hardship,” and (2) the statute did provide a “comprehensive
directive” for the EPA’s decisions regarding exemptions.76 As noted above,
part of the exemption framework included the DOE’s recommendations
regarding an exemption, and the DOE’s scoring matrix for evaluations of
small refineries included two parts: economic metrics and viability
metrics.77 The DOE’s scoring matrix, while considering factors such as the
long-term (and short-term) viability of a refinery forced to comply with the
RFS program through RINS compliance, did not require compliance with
the program to threaten the continued existence of the refinery in order to
recommend an exemption.78 Contradicting the EPA’s strict interpretation of
viability, the DOE recommended a fifty-percent (50%) waiver of RFS
requirements to allow for compliance by companies who met the criteria
both for and against exemptions.79 The DOE recommended the reduction

71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.

Id. at 992 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(2)(A)(i) (2017)).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 993.
Id.
Id. at 993–94.
Id. at 994.
Id.
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for Sinclair.80 The EPA, in denying Sinclair’s petition, confirmed its
position on “disproportionate economic hardship” as requiring the threat of
eventual closure, and noted that it bore the ultimate responsibility for such
determinations and therefore did not need to follow the DOE
recommendation.81
The court held that the EPA’s requirement of a viability test, as well as
its discounting of the DOE recommendation, placed it outside of
permissible interpretation by “reading a ‘viability’ requirement into the
statute and the ‘disproportionate’ requirement out of it.”82 The court noted
that viability was not an impermissibly attached factor to the analysis, as
“disproportionate economic hardship” is a term subject to considerable
interpretation, but by attaching the word “necessary” to the viability test
prior to the granting of an exemption altered the interpretation’s nature.83
The court analyzed the plain language meaning of “hardship,” as well as the
DOE’s own viability matrix, which included but did not require a risk of
closure.84 Although the EPA pointed to a viability test as permissible under
the “other economic factors” allowed by statute, the court still deemed the
decision to base an exemption off of the sole factor of viability ran contrary
to the “holistic evaluation required by Congress.”85 Furthermore, the court
recognized that Congress was well-versed in providing a “closure test” as it
relates to the CAA, and while the RFS program did not contain such a
clause, the lack thereof was then evidence of the lack of intent to require
closure as the sole analysis for exemption.86
By reviewing the EPA’s determination under Skidmore and Mead, the
Tenth Circuit determined that Sinclair correctly argued that the agency read
a necessary viability test into its consideration for exemptions, and by doing
so exceeded its statutory authority.87 The EPA’s viability requirement, as an
informal adjudication, was subject to an argument of persuasion before the
80. Id.
81. Id. at 995.
82. Id. at 996 (emphasis added).
83. Id.
84. Id. at 996–97 (citing, e.g., Oxford English Dictionary). The court noted that the
DOE provided three elements for the viability matrix, each of which ascended in potential
consequences for a refinery, from (1) reduced profitability, (2) temporary negative events, to
(3) risk of closure. Under the DOE analysis, the EPA chose to “ignore[] two-thirds of this
analysis.” Id.
85. Id. at 997 (emphasis added).
86. Id. at 997–98. Such an interpretation by the court is not likely permissible under the
deference of Chevron.
87. Id. at 997-99.
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court, and the court was unpersuaded of its validity.88 Therefore, the circuit
court vacated the EPA’s decision and remanded for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.89
B. Dissent
The dissent, written by Judge Lucero, addresses two primary points: (1)
the framework by which the majority analyzed the EPA’s decision, and (2)
the potentially precedential case law.90 The first point is based on the EPA’s
actual evaluation of the Sinclair refinery based on DOE findings.91
Although the EPA arguably disregarded the DOE’s findings, their own
metrics “reproduce[d] the Department’s scoring matrix for the facility.” 92
The EPA differed from the DOE, however, in requiring that a refinery
return scores qualifying the facility for exemption on both structural impact
and viability, but therefore the resulting score of zero for viability affected
the determination appropriately.93 The inference is that the EPA did not
simply require a viability test, but required viability as part of a thorough
analysis that should have been deemed appropriate by the court. The EPA’s
requirement that viability be endangered, according to the dissent, was
merely a determinative factor upon the structural impact, and that without a
viability score evidencing a threat to the refiner’s operations the structural
impact of compliance was simply not disproportionate.94 As viability itself
was a nuanced, comprehensive analysis, the dissent saw no reason to
overturn the agency’s determination.95 The second point is addressed by an
analysis of the potential circuit split.
C. Circuit Split
The District of Columbia Circuit held in Hermes Consolidated, LLC v.
EPA that a Chevron analysis of the EPA’s exemption denial compelled an
affirmation of the agency’s decision.96 The obligated party argued that
“[c]onsideration of a viability index . . . is inconsistent with that statutory

88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.

Id. at 999.
Id.
Id. at 999, 1002 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Id. at 999 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1000 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Id. (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1000–01 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1002-04 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Hermes Consolidated, LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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mandate.”97 With regard to “disproportionate economic hardship,” the
petitioner contended that the EPA’s determination was either (1) entirely
invalid under step 1 of Chevron, or (2) an impermissible interpretation of
Chevron.98 The D.C. Circuit held that the statutory authority of the EPA to
consider viability as determinative to “disproportionate economic hardship”
was clearly established by the mandate to consult with the DOE and
determine how to evaluate exemption requests.99 Furthermore, under the
second step of Chevron, the EPA’s evaluation was reasonable, and opined
(importantly for the Sinclair dissent) that:
Even considered on its own terms, EPA’s interpretation of the
phrase “disproportionate economic hardship” is wholly
reasonable. DOE concluded, and EPA agreed, that the relative
costs of compliance alone cannot demonstrate economic
hardship because all refineries face a direct cost associated with
participation in the program . . . DOE determined that the best
way to measure “hardship” entailed examining the impact of
compliance costs on a refinery’s ability to maintain profitability
and competitiveness—i.e., viability—in the long term. EPA
adopted DOE’s understanding, and that choice lies well within
the agency’s discretion.100
The majority in Sinclair noted that the Hermes decision rested on
petitioner’s choice to suggest that a viability factor was entirely
impermissible under Chevron, a strategy that it noted was not factually
supported and so differentiated the case from its own.101 The dissent
preferred to view the opinions as addressing the reasonableness of EPA’s
decision, regardless of what it viewed as minimally distinguishing facts.102
The Eighth Circuit similarly determined in Lion Oil Co. v. EPA that the
EPA’s denial of a small refinery exemption was appropriate.103 Lion Oil
argued that the EPA’s determination was arbitrary and capricious based on
the EPA’s reliance on a flawed DOE scoring matrix.104 In affirming the
agency’s determination, the Eighth Circuit held that the statute requires that
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id. at 574.
Id. at 574–75.
Id. at 575.
Id.
Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 998-99.
Id. at 1002 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
Lion Oil Co. v. EPA, 792 F.3d 978 (8th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 982.
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the EPA consider DOE findings and that the EPA’s interpretation of
“disproportionate economic hardship” was reasonable.105 The majority in
Sinclair found the opinion lacking as to the argument before the Tenth, in
that the Eighth was not considering (or it was not clear) that Lion Oil
argued against the EPA’s determination of “disproportionate economic
hardship” on the grounds that the agency considered viability, and viability
alone, as the ultimate determinative of exemptions.106 The dissent noted the
Eighth Circuit’s reference to viability as an appropriate, and important,
element of an EPA determination upon which financial burden cannot, by
itself, sway a decision.107
V. Analysis
A. Importance of the Decision
The Tenth Circuit’s decision is not only important for providing judicial
interpretation of the EPA’s small refinery exemptions within the RFS/RINS
program. First, Sinclair persuaded the majority that the appropriate
administrative analysis fell under Skidmore, an interpretation that likely
signifies the continuation of a judicial trend that may ultimately override or
modify Chevron deference. There is an ongoing presumption that the
current Supreme Court will be willing to overturn Chevron. Opposition to
Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s appointment to the Supreme Court, if limited to
academic and judicial considerations, rested strongly on the presumption
that Justice Kavanaugh will seek to overturn Chevron.108 Justice Gorsuch is
already on the record as skeptical of a doctrine that requires judicial
deference to administrative interpretations of law.109 Justice Thomas has
vocalized opposition to Chevron in Supreme Court opinions.110 Should
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito, as conservative voices on the bench
105. Id. at 984 (citing Hermes Consolidated, LLC v. EPA, 787 F.3d 568 (D.C. Cir.
2015)).
106. Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 999.
107. Id. at 1002 (Lucero, J., dissenting).
108. Michael McConnell, Kavanaugh and the “Chevron Doctrine,” HOOVER INST. (July
30, 2018), https://www.hoover.org/research/kavanaugh-and-chevron-doctrine.
109. Henry Gass, Gorsuch hearings: Should agencies–or courts–decide the law?,
CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Mar. 22, 2017), https://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Justice/2017/
0322/Gorsuch-hearings-Should-agencies-or-courts-decide-the-law.
110. Valerie C. Brannon and Jared P. Cole, Deference and its Discontents: Will the
Supreme Court Overrule “Chevron?”, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. (October 11, 2018),
https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/LSB10204.pdf (citing Michigan v. EPA, 135 S.Ct. 2699 (2015)
(Thomas, J., concurring)).
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and presumably of a similar mindset to the aforementioned justices, join
such opposition, the Supreme Court would appear primed to reconsider
Chevron.111 Cases such as Sinclair might provide sufficient reason (through
a potential circuit split and the highly politicized nature of the RINS
program) for the Court to use the EPA’s exemption determinations as the
proper vehicle through which to do so.
The ramifications of the Tenth Circuit’s holding are also significant
because of the potential circuit split, as discussed by the dissent. As both
the dissent and potential circuit split opinions are discussed above, it
suffices to note their existence and the resulting actions by the EPA. The
dispute among the Tenth Circuit judges was the importance placed by the
EPA on terminology within the exemption framework of the RINS
program. If the EPA determines that its methodology used to refuse an
exemption request to Sinclair refining was indeed sufficient, and therefore
only poorly articulated before the Tenth Circuit majority (as insinuated by
the dissent), it is likely that further judicial challenges will result in
disparate circuit holdings. If other circuits review the same EPA
methodology regarding RINS exemptions, there will be further opportunity
for differing opinions on both judicial deference and factual conclusions. It
is likely, however, that the EPA will (and has) changed its policy to allow
for greater exemption grants. Although the EPA does not disclose its
exemptions publicly, reports indicate that requests, and potentially grants,
for the exemption have doubled since Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v.
EPA.112 Based on such rough reports, it is logical to suggest that the EPA
has changed its methodology rather than pursue continued judicial
interpretation of its past methods. Therefore, while the EPA’s voluntary
action may moot the specific circuit split described by the Sinclair dissent,
the continued administration of the RFS program will remain a contentious
issue for litigation by all affected parties.
111. Id. The authors speculate that Chief Justice Roberts or Justices Alito or Breyer
(albeit for different reasons) might seek to narrow Chevron’s scope or eliminate the doctrine
altogether.
112. Jarret Renshaw, Chris Prentice, and Jessica Resnick-Ault, EPA grants biofuel credit
exemptions for small refineries, REUTERS (April 3, 2018), https://www.hydrocarbon
processing.com/news/2018/04/epa-grants-biofuel-credit-exemptions-for-small-refineries;
Ethanol Coalition Files Suit Against EPA’s Secretive Small Refinery Exemptions, AM. COAL.
FOR ETHANOL (May 29, 2018), https://ethanol.org/news/news/2018/05/29/ethanol-coalitionfiles-suit-against-epa’s-secretive-small-refinery-exemptions/ (“Although EPA typically
publishes its proposed actions and final decisions in the Federal Register, EPA has not
followed those protocols for small refineries; nor has EPA even informed the public by any
means that it had received or acted on such carve-out requests.”).
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The third reason the Sinclair decision is likely to retain significant
interest in the energy industry is because of potential changes dictated to the
entire RFS program. Debate over the intent, efficacy, and sustainability of
the program has continued unabated since the inception of the program.113
Certain segments of academia have criticized the program and the
implementation thereof.114 The industries involved in the RFS/RINS
program are large and influential. Simply put, the attention paid to an
administrative decision regarding substantial interests within those
industries will be significant. As noted above, a single exemption
determination has significant financial implications for multiple parties. It is
a simplistic narrative to suggest that the oil industry disfavors the
RFS/RINS program simply because of the financial considerations attached
to program exemptions, just as it is equally simple to suggest that biofuel
producers favor the program for the opposite reasoning. Nevertheless, it is
true that the economics of the RINS requirements places the oil industry
presumptively against the program, whereas biofuel producers and many
environmental policymakers presumptively favor the program. As such
large interests collide, any judicial decision with significant program
ramifications, such as Sinclair, will encourage adversarial rhetoric and
maneuverings.
B. Analysis of the Sinclair Majority
The Tenth Circuit’s review under Skidmore deference resulted primarily
because the EPA’s informal adjudication processing of refinery exemptions
mirrored that in Mead, the Supreme Court precedence calling for lower
judicial deference.115 The court’s reasoning is persuasive. Other than the
simple fact that the EPA’s determination followed a similar mechanism for
decision-making as in Mead, the agency’s determination lacked many of
the characteristics by which deference is typically preferred. Although the
113. Compare, e.g., Article, Antoine C. Schellinger, Energy is Energy: Segregation of
Renewable and Fossil Fuels Impedes Energy Security Goals, 55 S. TEX. L. REV. 471 (2014)
with Zippy Duval, Time to Build on the Success of RFS, AM. FARM BUREAU FED’N (June 13,
2018), http://www.fb.org/viewpoints/time-to-build-on-the-success-of-rfs.
114. See, e.g., Kourtney Lanea Kech, Comment, Supply and Demand, One and the Same
Since When?: The EPA’s Failed Attempt to Find a Loophole in the Renewable Fuel
Standard, 5 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RES. 397 (2017). The author evaluated the EPA’s
implementation of promulgated regulations regarding biofuels within the RFS program.
Analyzed under Chevron, the author concluded that courts could find that the EPA was
implementing biofuel waivers favorably to oil industry’s interests rather than as it was
statutorily authorized, thereby potentially invalidating some of its regulations.
115. Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 992.
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court noted that informal agency actions do not necessarily require
Skidmore deference, such contexts do create a need for a more thorough
analysis of which deference is appropriate.116 Formal notice-and-comment
procedure allows for interested parties to contribute to administrative
policy, and the lack of such ability threatens to render an administrative
decision more arbitrary. The lack of such protections in Sinclair did not
immediately render Skidmore as the appropriate vehicle for review, and
instead was part of a larger context. The inability of Sinclair to support its
position through petition or expert testimony also threatened the integrity of
the administrative process. Through such a limited process, only one party
may voice a thorough argument in support of its position. Although
agencies must make informal decisions to efficiently operate the day-to-day
operations of the agency, once judicially challenged an informal decision
lacks the inherent authority of a properly vetted and established rule.
Therefore, Sinclair’s lack of an ability to support its case in an
administrative hearing added to context suggesting Chevron was the
inappropriate deferential standard to apply.
The Tenth Circuit also noted weaker contextual evidence, such as (1) a
mid-level official making the determination, (2) the lack of precedential
value to the determination, and (3) the EPA’s own interpretation as “only a
few years old.”117 Although each prong may not require Skidmore deference
by itself, the cumulative narrative created by the above points creates a
context which compelled the court’s reasoning to apply Skidmore.118 The
Barnhart factors that would allow a court to review an informal
administrative decision with Chevron deference simply were not present as
a result of the informal process. Although the RFS/RINS administration is,
by its very nature, a complex subject that the EPA is uniquely situated to
understand and implement, refineries seeking exemptions are similarly
sophisticated parties that operate within the RFS/RINS regulations, and a
process that limits the adversarial system—a system that presumptively
results in fairer and more just results—is rightfully afforded less deference.
It must be noted that judicial deference under Skidmore does not
automatically render an administrative decision improper. Although the
context before the court in Sinclair turned on which deference the court

116. See id.
117. Id.
118. See id.
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chose to apply, informal decisions by agencies are not presumptively
invalid and the holding is limited to the circumstances of the case.119
The analysis thus turns to the Tenth Circuit’s evaluation of the EPA’s
determinative process. By the factual terms expressed by the majority, the
EPA did exceed its authority. A plain reading of the statutory language
reveals a clear intent of Congress to grant small refinery exemptions should
a number of economic factors emerge that show disproportionate economic
hardship. The statute explicitly states that the EPA “shall” (a mandatory
command) consider the DOE’s findings as it relates to “disproportionate
economic hardship.”120 Although the EPA received DOE findings, as
mandated by statute, the agency categorically denied the DOE’s
recommendation (a 50% waiver of RINS compliance) due to its official,
stated belief that “disproportionate economic hardship” was intrinsically
tied to long-term viability.121 The terms are not synonymous, and the
rejection of the DOE recommendation (statutorily required to be
considered) further provides evidence of an arbitrary or capricious agency
determination unauthorized by statute. The dissent’s characterization of the
EPA’s test as satisfactory runs contrary to the EPA’s own admission that
viability remained of primary importance. The apparent willingness of the
EPA to disregard the DOE finding provided strong evidence that the agency
was operating outside of its statutory authority.
The initial failure of the EPA to consider the DOE’s findings influenced
the review of the agency’s interpretation of “disproportionate economic
hardship.”122 The evidence before the court convincingly suggested that the
EPA interpreted statutory provisions in an independent manner not
completely in accordance with statutory authority. Although the court noted
that the legislature did not define “disproportionate economic hardship,”123
the application of Skidmore deference did not require the court to accept the
agency interpretation, particularly when such an interpretation was
accompanied by legislative command regarding input into the decision. As
the DOE finding is statutorily essential to considering exemptions, the
EPA’s apparent refusal to so consider rendered their own interpretation
vulnerable upon judicial review. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit’s review of
119. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 et seq. (2017) (governing judicial review agency regulations or
actions); see also Sinclair at 992 (noting “the decisions hold no precedential value for third
parties,” a fact that would not change with judicial intervention).
120. 42 U.S.C. § 7545(o)(9)(B) (2017).
121. See Sinclair, 887 F.3d at 994–95.
122. See id. at 993.
123. Id. at 993.
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the Sinclair decision is rational within the administrative boundaries of the
action.
VI. Conclusion
Sinclair Wyoming Refining Co. v. EPA represents a significant shift in
judicial review of a disputed, and financially important, government
program. Following the Tenth Circuit’s overturning of the EPA’s
administrative denial of a small refinery exemption as it pertains to the
Renewable Fuel Standard, the economic consequences of the decision will
encourage continued litigation as parties seek to fully understand the
ramifications of the holding. That understanding is further complicated by
other circuit opinions that suggest a split regarding analysis of the EPA’s
RFS program interpretation. The purposeful application by the Tenth
Circuit of Skidmore deference to the judicial review is also important to any
subsequent litigation. The combination of political attention and legal
indecision should create a ripe context for the Supreme Court to grant
certiorari on the issue. Although prognostication of Supreme Court
decisions is difficult at best, the current Court seems ideally situated to
grapple with judicial review of the administrative state. Sinclair Wyoming
Refining Co. v. EPA may prove to be a catalyst for significant policy
changes for either—or both—the Renewable Fuel Standard or the modern
administrative state.
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